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Abstract 
International air travel has an increasing impact on the epidemiology of infectious diseases. A 
particular public health, economic, and political concern is the role air travel plays in bringing 
infected passengers or vectors to previously non-endemic areas. Yet little research has been 
conducted to evaluate either the infection risks associated with air travel or the empirical evidence 
for the effectiveness of control measures on aircraft and at borders. This paper briefly reviews the 
interface between international and national legislation, policy, and guidelines in the context of 
existing infection risks and possible scenarios. We found that public health guidance and 
legislation, which airlines are required to follow, are often contradictory and confusing. Infection 
control measures for air travel need to be underpinned by coherent and enforceable national and 
international legislation, founded on solid epidemiological evidence. We thus recommend a 
systematic review of existing evidence, further research investment into more effective onboard 
vector control, health screening, and risk communications strategies, and development of 
enforceable and harmonised international legislation. 
 
Introduction 
Low air fares and a multitude of social and economic factors have resulted in increased air travel. 
The number of journeys flown by passengers each year has grown from approximately 640,000 in 
1980 to more than 3.4 billion journeys in 20151. The epidemiology of infectious diseases 
associated with air travel and the challenges of control are important, yet relatively little discussed 
or researched, public health concerns2. Aircraft can now travel to virtually any part of the world 
within 24 hours, and may enable infection spread either by: (i) in-flight infection transmission or (ii) 
transporting infected passengers or vectors from endemic to non-endemic regions, e.g. malaria-
infected mosquitoes, putting populations in destination countries at risk. The combination of rising 
passenger numbers, new travel destinations, and on-board transmission events, can impact 
imported disease patterns, including SARS, MERS, and Ebola3. For example, the current Zika 
outbreak is believed to have been introduced to the Americas by air travel4. Managing these risks 
requires knowledge of transmission dynamics and the potential effectiveness of control measures, 
suggesting that frontline employees (e.g. airline staff) would need appropriate training in handling 
suspected disease cases. 
 
As a result of experiences with SARS, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) issued the 
‘Emergency Response Plan and Action Checklist’, which consists of guidelines and best practices 
for aircrews during public health emergencies5. To reduce the risk of onboard disease 
transmission, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides cabin crews with 
information on general infection control measures and guidelines to identify ill and potentially 
infectious passengers6. However, airline conditions that require medical clearance vary, and may 
be subject to individual airline policy 7.  
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The effectiveness of infectious disease response strategies largely depends on the prompt 
identification of cases8. Current measures, such as entry and exit screening, isolation, quarantine, 
and travel health information may not be feasible or sufficient to control disease transmission. For 
example, the value of entry screening has been questioned by Bell9 and Hale10, while an 
evaluation of border entry screening concluded that a combination of disease-associated 
communications with passengers and clinicians may be a more effective strategy for global 
infectious disease control11. Collectively, the unique dynamics and interactions at play in an aircraft 
environment require a distinct response to infectious disease control. 
 
We consider the disconnects between global health law, national jurisdictions, organisational 
guidelines, and aircrew compliance by discussing existing risks and presenting two infection 
scenarios based on current airline practice12. 
 
Infection risks 
In-flight transmission 
While risk of disease transmission exists whenever people congregate in confined spaces, aircraft 
are unique in having individuals from often diverse geographical regions, with differing population 
immunity and exposure risks, interacting with aircrews and each other6. Infection may occur via (i) 
direct transmission through contact with skin, blood or other bodily fluids (e.g. Ebola virus), or (ii) 
indirect transmission without human-to-human contact. Indirect transmission on an airplane can 
occur through infectious droplets (e.g. influenza virus), through contaminated surfaces or objects 
(e.g. methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), or via vectors including mosquitoes, flies, and 
fleas (e.g. malaria, leishmaniasis). 
Long-distance air travel in particular exposes passengers to a number of factors that may affect 
disease transmission. A pathogen’s transmission characteristics, ambient climatic conditions, time 
spent on board, and aircraft type may hamper quantification of general transmission risk13. 
Absolute figures for the risk of in-flight disease transmission are therefore not readily available and 
the evidence base is limited14. Mangili et al reported in-flight transmission of influenza, SARS, 
tuberculosis, measles, smallpox, and other pathogens2.  On a 3-hour flight from Hong Kong to 
Beijing in 2003, 16 of 120 passengers were infected with the SARS virus by a single ill 
passenger15, while modelling has demonstrated the possibility of in-flight transmission of MERS-
CoV16. 
 
Protective measures are in place in modern aircraft, but may not be as robust as assumed. For 
example, commercial aircraft use High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters to limit exposure to 
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small airborne particles. However, there are no regulations requiring HEPA filters or testing filter 
effectiveness17.  
 
Carriage of infected passengers or vectors 
In 2014, Ebola was brought to the US18, the UK19 and Nigeria20 by undiagnosed Ebola sufferers 
aboard aircraft. Brownstein et al demonstrated the impact of air travel on the global spread of 
seasonal influenza, noting that decreased air traffic following the attacks of 11 September 2001 
was associated with a delayed influenza season21.  Maloney and Cetron documented the air-travel 
associated transmission of meningococcal disease22 . Global air travel may spur epidemics by 
bringing viruses and parasites to new locales23.  Infected mosquitoes on intercontinental flights are 
believed to have contributed to the global spread of malaria23, 24. West Nile virus is widely 
suspected to have been spread to the US by an infected mosquito carried by plane 24. The 
introduction of Zika to the Americas is noted to have coincided with an upsurge of air travel to 
Brazil from endemic countries in 20134. 
  
Managing the risk of transporting infected passengers requires knowledge of transmission 
dynamics and potential effectiveness of airport entry and exit screening, the ability to appropriately 
isolate or quarantine individual passengers on an aircraft, and adequately trained aircrew able to 
identify signs of infection and take appropriate measures. For example, WHO maintains there is 
little risk of vector-borne diseases being transmitted aboard aircraft 25, but recommends 
“disinsection” of aircraft (a public health measure involving insecticide treatment of aircraft interiors 
and holds25), stating that “there have been frequent instances of insects of public health 
importance being introduced from one country to another, with occasional dire consequences”23. 
However, the effectiveness of disinsection is unclear26. Minimising the risk of inadvertently carrying 
insect vectors requires consistent use of effective control measures, including disinsection 
insecticides that are safe for frequent aircrew exposure.   
 
Legislation and guidance  
Public health measures for international air travel include a range of national and international 
legislative tools, policies, and guidelines. Globally, 196 countries signed the legally binding 
International Health Regulations (IHR), aiming to control global disease spread27. However, the 
only IHR provision relating to air travel is the requirement that all chief pilots provide a brief Aircraft 
General Declaration on passenger health to ground staff before disembarkation.  
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) coordinate with WHO and provide recommendations, but specific controls are left to the 
discretion of individual countries. National guidance and legislation is uncoordinated across 
countries and, with no strong evidence underpinning control measures, often inconsistent. 
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Following the SARS epidemic, IATA recommended that all air carriers create an “Emergency 
Response Plan” for public health emergencies, but these are guidelines only and legislative 
powers lie with national authorities5. Airlines face conflicting obligations, since they must comply 
with infectious disease controls in both origin and destination countries28. 
 
Airlines owe a duty of care to three different groups, i.e. passengers, aircrew, destination country 
populations, and these duties sometimes conflict. For example, the US Environmental Protection 
Agency prohibits usage of some insecticides due to potential risks to aircrew, while national laws in 
Australia and New Zealand require their usage. US airlines flying to these countries must purchase 
insecticides at stopovers, and airline unions have raised serious concerns about their “inconsistent 
and inappropriate application,” toxicity and potential adverse health effects29. Other airlines 
reported difficulties in aircraft storage of aerosol insecticides that were either banned or prohibited 
from import in some destination countries30.  Additionally, doubt exists as to the efficacy of 
disinsection, with research identifying increasing mosquito insecticide resistance26. Although the 
ICAO encouraged more research into non-chemical disinsection procedures in 201331, procedures 
have not changed and airplane disinsection policy and implementation remain inconsistent 
worldwide. 
 
Airlines and national authorities may refuse passengers they consider to be a health risk. The US 
Air Carrier Access Act states that carriage can be refused where a passenger presents with a 
disease that “is both readily transmitted during a flight and which has serious health consequences 
(e.g. SARS but not AIDS or a cold)”32. This rule applies to all flights of US carriers and flights to or 
from the US but clearly requires any disease to be diagnosed pre-flight. Considerable debate 
continues about the effectiveness and practicality of passenger entry and/or exit screening. Further 
research must be prioritised before national and international legislation can take a consistent, 
evidence-informed approach to screening as flight duration and pathogen transmission dynamics 
are just two important factors that challenge ‘one size fits all’ recommendations33.  
 
Liability 
Enforcement of national laws is highly variable, with non-compliance carrying financial penalties 
and criminal sanctions in some countries, whilst in others there is little evidence of enforcement. 
Some 191 countries are signatories to the Montreal Convention, which imposes obligations to 
protect passengers34. However, while this Convention enables compensation claims to be made, 
proving an airline’s liability for someone contracting an infectious disease in-flight may be very 
challenging evidentially. Even if transmission time can be proven, airlines can defend the extent to 
which they should be expected to identify the risk. They may argue that liability should lie with the 
infectious passenger who took the flight without notifying the airline or health authorities35. While 
industrial injury claims have been brought on behalf of aircrew for alleged adverse reactions to 
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constant insecticide exposure in aircraft, these have been defended on the basis that airlines were 
following WHO guidelines36, 37.   
 
The Montreal Convention does not apply to individuals in a destination country who may become 
infected by a passenger or imported vector. While there may still be regulatory liability, and 
personal litigation against an airline may be undertaken, again, proving causal transmission may 
be extremely difficult, particularly if the disease did not become symptomatic until sometime after 
the flight in question. 
 
Scenarios   
Two hypothetical scenarios illustrate the potential occurrence and wider implications of disease 
transmission on aircraft.  
 
Scenario 1: Direct transmission  
Ebola is an infectious and often fatal disease marked by fever, nausea, vomiting, and less 
frequently haemorrhaging, spread through infected body fluids. On a flight from Frankfurt to 
Washington, a 40-year old passenger started complaining of a severe headache, abdominal pain, 
nausea, and sweating. He recalled no specific symptoms before boarding, but claimed he had 
been feeling generally unwell since his arrival from Abuja, Nigeria, an interim stopover on his 
itinerary that had originated in Kampala two days earlier. About three hours into the flight his 
symptoms worsened and the cabin supervisor requested medical assistance. As there was no 
doctor on board, a nurse examined the passenger and, suspecting he might be infectious, advised 
the crew to “isolate him as a precautionary measure.” The passenger was taken to a seat near the 
galley and looked after by two crew-members for the remainder of the flight. Meanwhile, he had 
violent bouts of vomiting and became increasingly disoriented. The cabin supervisor notified the 
chief pilot of a sick passenger, but did not communicate the severity of his condition. The pilot 
assumed the situation was controlled and did not contact US health authorities. Upon landing, the 
passenger’s condition had deteriorated and an ambulance was requested. After 24 hours the 
passenger was determined to be positive for Ebola.  
  
This scenario illustrates a lack of communication between crew-members and between aircrew 
and ground staff/destination. This delayed notification of a potentially severe health risk from 
infected body fluids, such as vomit, and an ambulance with infection control facilities should have 
been requested while the plane was airborne. This represents non-compliance with IATA guidance 
and a potential criminal breach of US health and quarantine laws. US laws are enforceable against 
both individuals and organisations, with penalties including fines and imprisonment38.  
 
Scenario 2: Vector-borne transmission 
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Vector-borne diseases (e.g. malaria, yellow fever, Zika) are transmitted by mosquitoes or other 
vectors to humans, causing a significant proportion of the global infectious disease burden39. 
Mosquito ecology suggests that aircraft are associated with a higher risk of introducing a live 
infected mosquito than are sea or road transport40. Following national requirements, disinsection 
was carried out by aircrew during descent into Mumbai airport. The flight had originated in London. 
A passenger who regularly travelled this route objected to being sprayed with insecticide, pointing 
to potentially dangerous adverse health effects. He added that having travelled on different 
carriers, he had not witnessed any in-flight spraying for years. On the return flight, several 
passengers complained about the presence of mosquitoes in the cabin before take-off. The aircraft 
had been parked on the apron of Mumbai airport, with cabin and cargo doors open during baggage 
loading and passenger embarkation. Passengers demanded protection from mosquitoes and 
wondered why spraying was conducted upon entering India, but not upon departure.  
 
This scenario illustrates inconsistencies and lack of monitoring of disinsection policy. Indian 
national law requires disinsection on inbound flights, but is itself a reservoir of vector-borne 
diseases. Guidance from WHO and IATA uses permissive rather than mandatory language on 
disinsection and it is left to national policy whether countries choose to implement a “blanket 
approach” to all arriving aircraft or only require disinsection on selected aircraft. Policies are not 
always clear and it is necessary to balance fears of health risks from both insecticides and 
mosquitoes. 
 
Conclusions 
To be effective, infection control measures for air travel need to be underpinned by coherent and 
enforceable national and international legislation, founded on solid epidemiological evidence. As 
aircrew are not infectious disease specialists and would not normally have medical training, 
recognising potential disease cases and adequately communicating an inflight illness remains 
challenging and ad-hoc. The dynamics of existing, emerging, and re-emerging infectious 
pathogens mean that infectious diseases will always challenge control efforts as pathogens exploit 
novel evolutionary niches. Incoherent guidelines and inconsistently applied laws hinder control 
efforts unnecessarily and the research underpinning airline control measures needs to be 
strengthened considerably.  
 
Public health involves balancing the rights of the majority against those of the individual and issues 
related to air travel require particular review and improvement by the global health community. 
First, a systematic review of the evidence supporting control measures for infectious diseases 
transmission via air travel should be conducted. Second, airlines and the global health community 
need to invest in research to identify better, non-toxic (to humans) insecticides or non-chemical 
means to control insect vectors. Third, airport health screening requires additional research and 
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investment to better identify infectious passengers. Such passengers may otherwise travel 
undiagnosed and on disembarkation disappear into the local population, at risk to themselves and 
others.  Some responsibility should lie with the individual.  Disease transmission can be minimised 
if passengers take appropriate precautions before or during a flight, or refrain from flying altogether 
when ill. Current education and communication strategies (and refund policies for missed flights) 
therefore warrant improvement. Fourth, these measures cannot be implemented in the absence of 
enforceable and harmonised international legislation and governance. Achieving this would be a 
significant challenge but a starting point might be for international or regional bodies, such as WHO 
or the European Union to produce model legislation or standards for the guidance of member 
states. This would require close consultation with IATO and/or ICAO. Enforceability might be 
encouraged by treating this as a security issue, comparable to ensuring the mechanical safety of 
aircraft. 
 
In the context of regular global air travel and evidence of dangerous non-endemic diseases 
appearing in new, vulnerable populations, airline-associated infection risks are growing. Potential 
costs, or inconvenience to passengers and aircrews, may be a lesser evil than transmission of 
potentially fatal infections to vulnerable populations. However, without concerted efforts from the 
global health community, the threat can be expected to worsen.   
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